In at least one respect, I’m more hawkish on China than almost anyone else. For instance, I’d like to see the US add Japan, S. Korea, Australia and New Zealand to the Nato alliance. According to the FT, this move is currently outside the Overton Window:
Beijing has repeatedly warned against the creation in Asia of any Nato-like military bloc, a prospect that security experts said was very unlikely since countries in the region have highly varied interests and strong economic ties with China. . . .
“It would complicate calculations for China if they need to think about not only the alliance with the US, but also the 30 members belonging to Nato,” said Yoshikazu Hirose, an expert on the alliance at the National Defense Academy in Japan.
Unfortunately, Nato expansion into East Asia seems unlikely to happen:
Stephen Nagy, senior associate professor at the International Christian University in Tokyo, said there would be limits to co-operation between Nato and its new partners.
“I think they would welcome any kind of diplomatic, financial and resource investment into Nato to push back against Russia,” Nagy said. “But do the Nato members want South Korea, Japan, Australia and New Zealand in their relationship and as equals sitting at the table? I’m not so sure.”
Over at Econlog, I frequently argue that Nato is just about the best thing that ever happened. As far as I’m concerned, the more the merrier—as long as the more don’t include countries hell bent on invading their neighbors and annexing territory, or countries without secure borders. If Kuwait had been a member of Nato back in 1990, both the Gulf War and the Iraq War never would have happened. Ultimately, the entire world will become members of Nato. Unfortunately, I won’t live to see that day.
In contrast to my super-hawkish Nato views, I’m dovish on trade. Indeed I’m disgusted by the US attempt to destroy China’s high tech sector by bullying smaller countries:
The US is pushing the Netherlands to ban ASML Holding NV from selling to China mainstream technology essential in making a large chunk of the world’s chips, expanding its campaign to curb the country’s rise, according to people familiar with the matter.
Washington’s proposed restriction would expand an existing moratorium on the sale of the most advanced systems to China, in an attempt to thwart China’s plans to become a world leader in chip production. If the Netherlands agrees, it would broaden significantly the range and class of chipmaking gear now forbidden from heading to China, potentially dealing a serious blow to Chinese chipmakers from Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corp. to Hua Hong Semiconductor Ltd.
American officials are lobbying their Dutch counterparts to bar ASML from selling some of its older deep ultraviolet lithography, or DUV, systems, the people said. These machines are a generation behind cutting-edge but still the most common method in making certain less-advanced chips required by cars, phones, computers and even robots.
When countries behave peacefully, we should have as much economic integration as possible. When countries invade their neighbors, we should punish them as much as possible. We need many more free trade blocs, a bigger Nato to protect smaller nations, and much more effective sanctions on Russia.
This study caught my eye:
New work by Giacomo Magistretti of the imf and Marco Tabellini of Harvard University also exploits falling air-transport costs to tease out the causal effect of trade on both attitudes towards democracy and the overall political orientation of a country. They find that stronger economic ties indeed facilitate the transmission of political values—but only if said values are democratic.
The effects are big. People who grew up during periods when their home economy traded comparatively more with democracies appear to be much more drawn to open regimes than those who came of age under opposite circumstances.
And how about this:
In March the Commerce Department humoured a request by Auxin Solar, an American manufacturer, to check if Chinese companies were circumventing anti-dumping tariffs. Duties had originally been imposed by Barack Obama, then extended by Mr Trump; Auxin claims that firms are dodging tariffs by making parts in China but assembling modules in their South-East Asian factories.
The effect is that a small American firm is obstructing more than 300 projects, according to a tally by the Solar Energy Industries Association, a lobby group. Some developers cannot get their hands on kit. Others find that costlier gear has put their construction deals in the red. NextEra told investors in April that up to 2.8 gigawatts of solar and battery projects planned for this year, equivalent to around a tenth of its intended renewables investments in 2021-24, would be delayed. American assemblers of solar panels, it said, were sold out for the next three years. America’s largest solar project, spanning 13,000 acres of Indiana, has been postponed. NiSource, the utility behind it, will instead delay the retirement of two coal-fired power stations to 2025.
PS. To head off a common criticism, the so-called “free rider problem” with Nato is a myth. Even if all Nato members were to merely spend 2% of GDP in defense, no non-member would dare to invade Nato. Who wants to take on roughly 2/3rds of the world’s military power, all alone? It’s not a concern.
PPS. Glad to hear that Sweden and Finland are about to join. Nato will become better than ever. And this shows that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was never about Nato (which Ukraine was not about to join), it was about Russian nationalism. Instead of complaining about Nato, Russia should become a civilized nation and join Nato.